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Case Comment
Constitutional Law: Extension of Right to
Jury Trial in State Criminal Prosecution
Defendant was charged with simple battery, a misdemeanor
punishable by a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment
and a $300 fine.1 Following denial of his request for a trial by
jury,2 he was convicted and sentenced to serve 60 days in
jail and fined $150. The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied
certiorari.3 The United States Supreme Court reversed,4 holding
that the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment
guarantees a right to jury trial in all criminal cases which would
come within the sixth amendment guarantee 5 if tried before a
federal court. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Article III, section two6 and the sixth amendment of the Con-
stitution ostensibly require that the right to trial by jury be af-
forded those persons accused of crimes. Prior to Duncan, all
rights guaranteed to the criminally accused by the sixth amend-
ment, except for the right to trial by jury,7 had been extended
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.8 The right to
1. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:35 (1950).
2. Jury trial was denied pursuant to LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41,
which grants the right to a jury trial only in cases involving the pos-
sibility of capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor.
3. 250 La. 253, 195 So. 2d 142 (1967).
4. Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court was based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(2) (1966), which provides that the Supreme Court may review
the decision of the highest state court in which a decision could be had,
if the case involves a challenge to the validity of a state constitutional
provision or statute on the ground of its repugnancy to the United
States Constitution, and if the state court has upheld its validity.
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed . .. ."
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 states: "The trial of all crimes, except
in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury .... "
7. "It steadily has been ruled that the commandments of the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments, which require jury trial in criminal
and certain civil cases, are not picked up by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth so as to become limitations on the States." Fay v. New
York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947), citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
324 (1937), and cases cited therein. Accord, Ex parte Whistler, 65 F.
Supp. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1945), where the court said that article MI, § 2
applies only to the federal courts.
8. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)
(speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of
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jury trial as set forth in article III, section two had not only been
limited to the federal courts, but also had been consistently in-
terpreted as only being guaranteed to the extent that it was rec-
ognized at common law.9 Since it was the practice at common
law to try petty offenses in summary proceedings, 0 a large
number of offenses were excluded from the scope of the terms
"crimes"" and "criminal prosecutions"' 2 as used in the Consti-
tution.13 Thus petty offenders were denied the right to jury
trials in the federal courts.14 The fifth and sixth amendments,
while guaranteeing the preservation of certain traditions of
trials by jury which article III, section two fails to mention,' 5 do
not enlarge the right to jury trial as established by that arti-
cle.16
opposing witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right
to counsel in criminal prosecutions); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)
(public trial).
9. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930); Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540
(1888).
10. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); District
of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930); Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276 (1930); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). But see J. Fox,
HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 203-09 (1927).
11. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
13. The authors of the Constitution did not mention the "petty
crimes" exclusion in article III because it was too obvious to merit
their attention. Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and
the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Hazv. L. REv. 917,
969-70 (1926). In Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904), the Court
concluded that the use of the word "crimes" in article In evidenced
the intent of the drafters to exclude from the constitutional guarantee
of a jury the trial of petty criminal offenses, citing 4 Br.AcxsroN's
COMnMENTAnIS (1756). Contra, Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers,
26 U. CH. L. REv. 245 (1959). Kaye believes the words "crimes" and
"criminals" as used in the Constitution do not refer solely to major trans-
gressions. He notes that if the English practice were truly followed it
would lead to a more restrictive result than that adopted by Frank-
furter and Corcoran, since the English tried all misdemeanors summar-
ily.
14. Petty crimes and offenses include soliciting prostitution, Bailey
v. United States, 98 F.2d 306, 69 App. D.C. 25 (1938); engaging in the
business of selling second-hand property without a license, District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); and reckless driving, District
of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
15. The sixth amendment has been held to require a 12-man jury,
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898), and a unanimous verdict,
Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948).
16. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942); Schick v. United
States, 195 U.S. 65, 78 (1904); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888).
Amendment VI uses the term "all criminal prosecutions," as opposed to
article III, § 2 which speaks of "trial of all crimes." This was not,
19681
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The "petty crimes" exclusion has created a perplexing defi-
nitional problem.17 The Supreme Court has stated that the sever-
ity of the penalty' and the nature of the crime 9 are the ele-
ments to be considered in determining whether an offense should
be classified as "petty" or "serious, '20 but no case has clearly
delineated the scope of those phrases.
however, intended to enlarge the scope of the right to a jury trial.
Concern over the scope of the jury trial provisions in article III was not
a motivating factor for the inclusion of the Federal Bill of Rights.
Instead, it was meant to dispel public fears regarding rights not enu-
merated in article III. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 13, at 970
n.248.
17. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 13, at 980-81 (1926):
Broadly speaking, acts were dealt with summarily which did not
offend too deeply the moral purposes of the community, which
were not too close to society's danger, and were stigmatized by
punishment relatively light. These general tendencies, both in
England and in the colonies, represent the history absorbed by
the Constitution ... [Judgment is required, not mechanical
tests]. We cannot exclude recognition of a scale of moral values
according to which some offenses are heinous and some are not.
Nor can we escape differentiation between severity of sentences
and relative lightness ... The history of the common law does
not solve the problem of judgment which it raises in demon-
strating that the guaranty of a jury did not cover offenses which,
because of their quality and their consequences, had a relatively
minor place in the register of misconduct.
The New York courts have held that trial by jury is not required
in misdemeanor cases-the decision as to the nature of the offense being
made by reference to the common law. People ex rel. Frank v. McCann,
253 N.Y. 221, 170 N.E. 898 (1930).
18. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); District of Colum-
bia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627 (1937).
19. In Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), the Court
broadly asserted that criminal contempt proceedings do not constitu-
tionally require jury trial, thus implying that the nature of the crime is
determinative, regardless of the seriousness of the violation or the
severity of the penalty. In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888), the
Court held that conspiracy is not a petty crime.
20. The petty crimes exclusion is rationalized on the theory that
the penalties resulting from convictions for petty offenses are not suffi-
ciently serious to justify jury trials in light of the increased efficiency
of law enforcement and judicial administration that would be fostered
by the denial of the right. Waiver of the right to jury trial, by the
exercise of a free and intelligent choice and with the approval of the
court and the government, also contributes to greater judicial efficiency
by reducing the number of jury proceedings. 391 U.S. at 160; see
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); FED. R.
CRim. P. 23 (a). The accused cannot compel a trial before a judge alone.
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), held that to compel an ac-
cused to submit to a jury trial is not a violation of his rights to a fair
trial and due process. What constitutes waiver depends on the facts of
each case. In Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), the Court
held that the defendant's acquiescence in an eleven man jury consti-
tuted a waiver of the entire jury. Regarding frequency of waiver of jury
trial and its relation to geographic region and type of crime, see H.
KALvEN & H. ZmsEL, THE AMEmCAx JuRY 24-32 (1966).
[Vol. 53:414
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In holding that the Constitution was violated when Duncan's
request for a jury trial was refused, the Court admitted it fa-
vored jury trial over other fair methods of criminal adjudica-
tion.21 The Duncan opinion outlined what the Court considered
to be the development of a new approach to the problem of
incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees into the fourteenth
amendment. In the past, incorporation had been based on the
importance of the particular procedural safeguard in a theoreti-
cal and ideal system of justice. The right to a trial by jury was
not felt to be one of those guarantees essential in a "scheme of
ordered liberty. '22 Recent cases, however, have proceeded on the
assumption that the importance of a procedural safeguard
should be judged by reference to its role in the Anglo-American
system of justice.23 The Duncan Court stressed the importance
of the jury in criminal law, stating that the framework and
procedures of the criminal process in every state developed in
connection with and in reliance upon the right to jury trial.24
Thus, the Court decided that the right to trial by jury in criminal
cases is "fundamental in the context of the criminal processes
maintained by the American States. '25 In so doing, it apparently
created and applied a new standard of incorporation.
Yet the Court refused to impeach the constitutionality of
waiver of jury trial 26 on the theory that an accused person who
prefers a bench trial will be as fairly treated by a judge as by a
jury because the mere guarantee of a right to jury trial will make
judicial or prosecutorial unfairness less likely.27 In addition, the
Court recognized that considerations of speed and efficiency en-
tered into its approval of waiver of jury trial, as well as prose-
cutions of petty crimes without a right to jury trial.2 8
The Court took into consideration the effect of its holding
and concluded that widespread changes in state criminal pro-
cedures would not be required even though prior constructions
of the sixth amendment right to jury trial would be extended to
the states.29  Thus, the Duncan holding may not represent as
great an extension of the right to jury trial as it appears on
21. 391 U.S. at 150 n.14.
22. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
23. 391 U.S. at 149 n.14.
24. Id. at 150 n.14.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 158. See note 20 supra.
27. 391 U.S. at 158.
28. See note 20 supra.
29. 391 U.S. at 158 n.30.
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the surface. In Mlinnesota, for exanple, there is already a con-
stitutional provision guaranteeing the right to jury trial to the
criminally accused.30 This provision has been construed to ex-
tend to all criminal prosecutions under state statutes, but not
to those involving municipal police regulations or ordinances, the
latter being considered "petty."31 This interpretation is at least
as broad a guarantee as exists under the Duncan rule. The
Court could find only two instances other than the Louisiana
scheme in which states deny jury trial for crimes punishable by
imprisonment for more than six months. In New Jersey, dis-
orderly conduct carries a one-year maximum sentence, but
the accused has no right to jury trial.32 New York allows jury
trials in New York City only for offenses punishable by more
than one year's imprisonment.33
The Duncan Court placed unprecedented emphasis on the
seriousness of the potential sentence in determining whether a
particular offense falls within the "petty crimes" exclusion.34
If the sentence is severe enough, that fact alone will subject the
trial to the jury requirement.3 5 The Court viewed the possible
sentence as a gauge of the social and ethical judgments of the
locality.86 Thus, the two year sentence which could have been
imposed on Duncan made his crime serious enough to entitle
him to a trial by jury.
The importance of the potential sentence to the definition
of "petty crimes" is underscored by the result in the compan-
ion case of Bloom v. Illinois.3 7 In that case the Court revoked
the former rule that the Constitution allows all criminal con-
tempt proceedings to be tried without a jury.8 According to the
30. 1mVw. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
31. State v. Ketterer, 248 Minn. 173, 177, 79 N.W.2d 136, 139 (1956).
But see State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959). Jury
trial is available on appeal to a district court. MIvN. STAT. § 484.63
(1967).
32. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 169-4 (1953), construed in State v.
Maier, 13 N.J. 235, 99 A.2d 21 (1953).
33. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 10.00(4) (McKinney 1967). See People
v. Sanabria, 42 Misc. 2d 464, 249 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cited by
the Court, 391 U.S. at 161 n.33.
34. 391 U.S. at 159.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 160.
37. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Bloom was convicted of criminal contempt
for having willfully petitioned to admit to probate a will falsely pre-
pared and executed after the death of the putative testator. He was
sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment.
38. The right to jury trial had previously been extended by statute
to certain federal criminal contempt prosecutions. Cheff v. Schnacken-
[Vol. 53:414
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Court, criminal contempt can no longer be viewed as an intrin-
sically petty offense, since strong consideration must be given to
the particular penalty imposed.39 Whether criminal contempt is
deemed a petty offense, triable without a jury, or a serious of-
fense requiring a right to jury trial depends upon the severity of
the punishment which may be administered.40  Because some
legislatures have not fixed maximum penalties which can be im-
posed in criminal contempt cases,41 the Bloom Court held that
the penalty actually imposed is the best evidence of the serious-
ness of the offense.42 Since the two-year penalty imposed on
Bloom made his crime a serious one, his conviction was re-
versed and he was held entitled to a trial by jury.43 It should
be noted that the Court refused to make an exception to this
rule for cases falling within the terms of Rule 42 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 44 The Court observed that
penalties imposed for contemptuous actions in the presence of
the forum are usually relatively light, and that imposition of the
Bloom rule in this context would not be unduly burdensome
because such infractions may still be punished summarily.45
The objective of the Court in both Duncan and Bloom appears
to have been to safeguard and strengthen the role of the jury in
preventing "oppression by the Government. " 46 Thus, in granting
a constitutional right to jury trial to persons accused of serious
criminal contempts, the Bloom Court noted that the need to
maintain respect for judges and courts is not entitled to more
consideration than the interest of the individual in securing the
berg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). The same was true in some states. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 233, 213 S.W.2d 983 (1948), construing
Ky. REv. STAT. § 432.260; Marco Industries, Inc. v. United Steel Workers
of America, 50 Berks 214 (Pa. Com. P1. 1958), construing PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 2047 (1962); and State v. Boren, 253 P.2d 939 (Wash. 1953), construing
REV. CODE WASH. § 9.23.010 (1961).
39. 391 U.S. at 211. See the discussion of prior cases in Comment,
51 MIfNx. L. REV. 967 (1967).
40. 391 U.S. at 198.
41. Id. at 206 n.8.
42. Id. at 211.
43. Id.
44. Rule 42(a): "A criminal contempt may be punished summar-
ily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting
the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the
court."
45. 391 U.S. at 210. The Bloom rule does not apply to civil con-
tempt cases. If the imprisonment is coercive, and the prisoner has the
ability to release himself by complying with the court's order, he has
no right to trial by jury. Shiflitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
46. 391 U.S. at 155.
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benefits of procedural safeguards before being subjected to
serious criminal punishment.47
The results in both Bloom and Duncan are subject to a
number of criticisms. The fact that relatively few states do not
already have a guarantee at least as broad as that required by
Duncan may itself call into question the wisdom of imposing
federal standards in state criminal matters relating to trial by
jury. It could be argued that such federal intervention and re-
striction of state autonomy serves no significant purpose at the
present time. Those who oppose federal interference with state
judicial systems will probably condemn the Duncan and Bloom
decisions on the ground that they open the way for future ex-
tension of the right to jury trial by the Supreme Court.
These fears, however, seem unfounded. The Court went to
some lengths to acknowledge its recognition of the problems to
efficient state judicial administration which would be posed by
an across-the-board extension of the right to jury trial. Thus, it
seems unlikely that in the future the Court will use its authority
in this field to promulgate jury standards which would seriously
alter present practices in state judicial systems.
A more valid criticism relates to the Court's failure to
delineate clearly the petty-serious dichotomy. 48 Moreover, it
can be argued that limitation of the right to jury trial to serious
offenses avoids dealing with the crux of the problem of unfair-
ness and governmental oppression in judicial proceedings.49 For
example, there is no constitutional right to trial by jury in cases
of violation of municipal ordinances despite the fact that con-
viction may lead to serious economic penalties.50
47. Id. at 208.
48. The Court cited Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966),
for the proposition that crimes carrying possible penalties of up to six
months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty
offenses. 391 U.S. at 159. But the six month limit is not constitution-
ally required. At common law some crimes triable without a jury were
punishable by up to one year's imprisomnent. Frankfurter & Corcoran,
supra note 13, at 932-33.
49. "The law has withdrawn from the universe of jury trials a
wide range of matters which, although described as petty, may well
involve the most frequent source of contact between the ordinary
citizen and the law." H. KALVEN & H. ZzIsEm, supra note 20, at 16-17.
50. The consequences to the defendant convicted in a municipal
ordinance violation proceeding would seem to justify the added
cost of a jury trial. The penalties upon conviction may include
a fine, imprisonment, and such other consequences as the loss of
a license that may be essential to the defendant's livelihood.
Note, Right to a Jury Trial for Persons Accused of an Ordinance Viola-
tion, 47 inyl. L. REv. 93, 106-07 (1963).
Vol. 53:414
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The problem of balancing the merits of jury trial as a safe-
guard against government oppression, against the burden re-
sulting from imposition of jury trials on state court systems and
the restriction of their flexibility, could conceivably have been
solved by modification of the jury system and extension of the
right to jury trial to more specific offenses. It has been argued
that the extension of prior constructions of the sixth amend-
ment51 to the states may, in this regard, be unwise.52 It is con-
tended that if limitations must be placed on the right to jury
trials in order to achieve efficiency, the petty-serious distinction
is a cumbersome and confusing method. 3
Even granting the validity of this argument, the Duncan
decision has some merit because it allows the states to innovate
and experiment within the petty crimes exclusion.54 Just as the
standards for applicability of the right to trial by jury were
broadened in many states before the Duncan decision,55 it is now
possible that those standards will be further broadened to apply
to certain petty crimes.
51. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948); Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
52. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (concurring
opinion).
53. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 392 (1966) (dissenting
opinion of Douglas, J.). Justice Douglas believes that for the Supreme
Court to undertake the task of defining a class of petty contempts would
be akin to an attempt to catalogue common law crimes-a power which
the federal judiciary does not have. He would require a trial by jury
before punishment can be imposed for any criminal contempt, until
the time when petty contempts are properly defined and isolated
from other species of contempts. He does not think sentence length is
the sole determinant of the gravity of the crime.
54. Although the sixth amendment does not guarantee a right to
trial by jury in petty offense cases, it does not prohibit it either.
55. 391 U.S. at 158 n.30.
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